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Dawn C. Nunziato [d1] 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
      In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, [1] Professor Lawrence Lessig gives us a masterful 
analysis of the future of life and law in cyberspace. Lessig predicts that the Internet will be 
fundamentally transformed from an unregulable place into a place of unprecedented regulability. 
According to Lessig, the Net of the near future will be regulated primarily by the software or 
“code” written by commercial entities such as America Online (“AOL”) and IBM. This code will 
embody certain value choices-choices in favor of censorship or freedom of expression, for 
example. When the government exercises the power to regulate and embodies values within its 
laws, this power, of course, is held in check by the Constitution. No similar checks exist, 
however, on commercial entities' power to embody (or reject) important values within their code. 
While the government cannot-consistent with the First Amendment- censor “indecent” speech on 
the Net, Internet service providers such as AOL can do so insulated from constitutional 
challenge. As commercial entities increasingly exercise the power to regulate conduct on the 
Net, does the code that enables such regulation stand in need of a constitution? How will our 
important values be translated and embodied in cyberspace, if the code writers and, therefore, the 
lawmakers are insulated from the checks on the power to regulate that are imposed by the 
Constitution? 
 
      One answer, provided by the Net libertarians, is that the power of commercial actors in 
cyberspace need not be checked by the Constitution because the market will accurately reflect 
the aggregate of our preferences in response to our individual acts of exit. If AOL does not 
respect freedom of expression (however that is appropriately defined) and if free expression is 
important to us, we will “vote” with our mice and choose another Internet service provider. 
Lessig expresses skepticism about the Net libertarian model, in which cyberspace is constructed 
on the model of the market, and contends that if we allow cyberspace to be constructed on such a 
model, important collective values will be sacrificed. 
 
      In Part I of this essay, I describe Lessig's claims about the nature of Net regulation. I then set 
forth the Net libertarian responses to these claims in Part II, focusing on the issue of whether a 
cyberspace constructed on the model of the market would incorporate one important collective 
value-the protection of unpopular speech against majority tyranny. In Part III, I analyze the 
preference-expressing mechanisms of exit and voice and examine the role of exit in both the 
libertarian utopian framework articulated by Robert Nozick and in the Net libertarian model. I 
consider the potential dangers that a model based on exit poses to the First Amendment value of 
protecting unpopular speech, and observe that the sufficiency of the exit model in protecting this 
important collective value is a function of the features and characteristics of the particular 
marketplace for speech under consideration. I conclude that Lessig has not shown that, given the 
present characteristics of the cybermarket, important collective values are endangered, nor that 
governmental (or other forms of) intervention to protect such values is warranted. Furthermore, I 
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argue that a model of cyberspace that incorporates the preference-expressing mechanism of 
voice, which Lessig apparently favors, would not necessarily bring about a cyberspace that better 
reflects our important collective values-unless the meta-value of “deliberation” were somehow 
built into the expression of voice. I contend, however, that Lessig has not shown that 
governmental (or other types of) intervention to impose the meta-value of deliberation into the 
expression of voice is warranted. 
 
      In Part IV, I return to the consideration of a cyberspace constructed on the model of the 
market and examine Lessig's claim that the government will be powerless to intervene if the 
characteristics of the cybermarket were no longer conducive to reflecting our important values. I 
argue that the state action doctrine does not prohibit courts from acting in circumstances where 
private regulation has threatened important collective values such as the protection of free 
expression. On the contrary, in interpreting the state action doctrine in circumstances where 
private parties have threatened free speech rights, courts have balanced the competing rights and 
interests at stake, examined the relevant features of the markets involved, and considered 
whether alternative meaningful avenues of expression remained available. 
 
 
II. THE CYBERWORLD ACCORDING TO LESSIG 
 
      Lessig's description of the future of regulation on the Net is essentially as follows: 
 
      Previously, we thought of the Internet as an unregulated and unregulable place. [2] What we 
failed to understand was that the Net's unregulability was a product of conscious choice made by 
the Net's early architects, who designed the architecture of the Net to make it an essentially 
unregulable place. [3] The architects of the Net rendered the Net essentially unregulable by 
designing its fundamental protocols to be ignorant about the identity of the authors, senders, and 
recipients of information made available on the Internet. [4] But, just as the Net could be (and 
was initially) designed and constructed to be an unregulable place, so too it could be designed 
and constructed, to be a highly regulable place: “whether the Net is unregulable depends, and it 
depends upon its architecture.” [5] 
 
      Regulation on the Net is distinct from the types of regulation we have heretofore known 
because it is effected through the Net's code or architecture. Of the four modalities of regulating 
behavior-law, social norms, the market, and code or architecture [6]-the latter is the most 
foolproof and effective form of regulation. Code is a uniquely effective from of regulation in that 
its constraints are self-executing and are imposed contempora neous with the behavior being 
regulated. [7] Furthermore, regulation via code allows behavior to be regulated by whoever is in 
charge of writing the code. Even though the architects of the Net designed the foundational 
architecture of the Net to make regulation difficult, [8] layers of code- architectures of 
identification and credentials for users and architectures that label data-can be added on top of 
this foundation to enable an unprecedented level and type of regulation. [9] Commerce can 
implement such regulation by adding layers of software of control in the application space of the 
Internet on top of the TCP/IP substratum, [10] including architectures that enable control 
regarding users and architectures that enable control regarding Net content. Moreover, even if it 
turns out that Commerce cannot bring about the greater regulability of the Net by itself, 
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Commerce can and will do so with the help of Government. In short, Commerce has the 
incentive to layer code on top of the Net's substratum that will enable identification of 
individuals and categorization of data, which in turn will transform the Net from an unregulable 
place to an extremely regulable place: “The ‘nature’ of the Net might once have been its 
unregulability; that ‘nature’ is about to flip.” [11] 
 
      The code by which the Net increasingly will be regulated-and regulated largely by 
Commerce-embodies values. The AOLs and IBMs of the world will be increasingly responsible 
for writing the code of the Net, which means that such commercial entities will be increasingly 
responsible for regulating the Internet. As such, the values embodied in the code of the Net will 
increasingly be chosen by Commerce-and driven by Commerce's interests. [12] 
 
      Consider some of the values that are embodied in the architecture or code of AOL, the 
world's largest online service provider. Certain forms and forums of expression are regulated by 
AOL-not by laws or norms, but by AOL's code itself. [13] First, AOL imposes certain limits on 
both the substance of its members' expression and the forums its members can use to express 
themselves. [14] AOL's code, for example, imposes limits on the number of people with whom 
one can chat. While the president of AOL can and does write letters to all AOL members, AOL 
members can never chat with more than twenty-three people. [15] In AOL space, there is no 
place where everyone can gather at one time, nor is there a place that everyone must, sooner or 
later, pass through. [16] As a result, AOL's code embodies values that are not readily conducive 
to the ideal of the public forum, an ideal that undergirds our First Amendment right to free 
speech. [17] Second, AOL also restricts the content of its members' speech as well as the 
viewpoints they may express-whether such speech occurs within AOL-space proper or anywhere 
else on the Net. [18] It prohibits, for example, “crude” sexual references [19] and “crude 
conversations about sex,” [20] as well as the expression of viewpoints about illegal drug use that 
imply such use is acceptable. [21] AOL-space in this way embodies certain speech-regarding 
values that are chosen and implemented by AOL via its code. 
 
      The speech-regarding values described above that are embodied in AOL-space are in conflict 
with the speech-regarding values embodied in the First Amendment. The First Amendment 
protects the expression of a diversity of viewpoints about drug use as well as the expression of 
“crude” sexual speech- at least against censorship by the government. [22] The architecture of 
real space is constructed in conformance with the ideal of public forums. [23] In contrast, “AOL 
is a different normative world; it can create this different world because it is in control of the 
architecture of that world.” [24] As a member of AOL, “[y]ou enter AOL and you find it to be a 
certain universe. This space is constituted by its code .... You live life in AOL subject to its 
terms; if you do not like them, you go elsewhere.” [25] 
 
Through its code, AOL has the ability to create a vast online normative community in 
which it has an extraordinary regulatory power-the power to embody and enforce certain 
fundamental values and to regulate members' behavior in accordance with these values. 
 
       If AOL does not like a certain behavior, ... it can regulate that behavior by changing its 
architecture. If AOL is trying to control indecent language, it can write routines that 
monitor [and filter] language usage; ... if there is stalking or harassing or threatening 
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behavior, AOL can block the connection between any two individuals. [26]      Just as AOL 
implements certain speech-regarding values in its cyberplace via code, so too will other 
commercial entities embody (or reject) other important values in their code, such as 
privacy, access, and equality.  [27] 
 
      The ultimate question Lessig puts to us is whether the shift in the power to regulate from 
Government to Commerce should go unchecked: “If we let the invisible hand work unimpeded 
... choices [about values] will be made according to the set of interests that are expressed by 
commerce on the Net.” [28] We must consider whether we can trust this market, and in 
particular, whether we can trust this market when doing so means entrusting it to embody (or 
reject) important values, such as free speech, privacy, access, and equality: “Effective regulation 
then shifts from lawmakers to code writers. The question for us is whether this shift should be 
unchecked.” [29] 
 
 
III. THE NET LIBERTARIAN RESPONSE 
       
The overarching question posed by Lessig is whether the shift in the power to regulate 
from Government to Commerce should go unchecked. In response to this overarching question, 
the Net libertarian answers that Commerce's power to regulate on the Net is already sufficiently 
held in check-by users' or customers' power of “exit.” According to the Net libertarian, the power 
held by a Net business's customers or a cybercommunity's members to leave one cyberplace and 
join another imposes a sufficient check upon the power of Commerce. [30] Because Commerce's 
power on the Net is sufficiently held in check, the Net libertarian continues, the Government has 
no legitimate role to play in further constraining Commerce's power on the Net. [31] 
 
      To explore this libertarian response, consider once again the speech-regarding values that 
AOL embodies in its code. Recall that AOL restricts the forms of expression that individuals can 
use while on the Net and restricts (among other things) what AOL considers to be inappropriate 
speech about sex and unsalutory viewpoints about drugs. [32] What, if anything, should be done 
about the fact that the speech-regarding values AOL embodies in its code are in tension with 
those embodied in the First Amendment? The libertarian response is that if AOL members find 
that the speech-regarding values embodied in AOL's code are inconsistent with their own, they 
can always vote with their mice, leave AOL, and become members of an online community that 
better suits their preferences.  [33] In this way, AOL's power to embody values in its code is 
already held in check by the power that AOL members have to switch to another Internet service 
provider (“ISP”) and/or by the possibility that a competitor to AOL will respond with an 
alternative that better suits exiting AOL members' preferences. 
 
      On the Net libertarian's reading, institutions on the Net should be conceptualized in what 
Lessig labels as the “consumer” model: [34] 
 
       If we don't like a particular cyber community, we can move-far more easily, in fact, 
than we can in real space. Because exit is so cheap, we should use exit as our ballot .... [On 
this model,] [t]he world of cyberspace would become a virtual menu, and if you don't like 
one selection, you simply pick something else. [35]      Lessig, however, finds the Net 
 - 5 -
libertarian model to be unacceptable-at least with respect to certain types of Net 
communities-because he believes that exit is an inappropriate preference-expressing 
mechanism with respect to such communities. He suggests that while exit may be an 
appropriate preference-expressing mechanism within the economic realm, it is ill-suited to 
the task of community-building (and further, democracy-building), because it is incapable 
of eliciting and expressing certain of our important collective values: 
 
       There is ... a more fundamental criticism [of the Net libertarian's consumer model]. 
Even if we could construct cyberspace on the model of the market-so that we relate to 
spaces in cyberspace the way we relate to toothpaste in real space-we should not want to do 
it. An important and long-standing tradition argues that beyond their role as consumers 
humans need to increase the contexts where they are members. Both as a matter of justice 
and as a matter of human flourishing, we need these parts of our lives where we have 
control over the architectures under which we live.       In at least some ways then, we 
should relate to cyberspace as members rather than as customers. [36]       ....       Most of us 
... believe that there are collective values that ought to regulate private action. We are also 
committed to the idea that collective values should regulate the emerging technical world. 
[37]       ....       ... [G]overnment is necessary to help establish the conditions necessary for 
liberty to exist. This is because there are collective values that, acting as individuals, we 
will not realize. [38] 
 
IV. EXIT, VOICE, AND COLLECTIVE VALUES IN CYBERSPACE 
 
      What might it mean for us to relate to cyberspace as “members rather than as customers”? 
[39] Is there a meaningful (or further, a necessary) alternative to the Net libertarian/consumer 
model, a model in which we do not “relate to spaces in cyberspace the way we relate to 
toothpaste in real space”? [40] Are there collective values that will not be realized in a 
cybermarket that responds solely to our individual preferences expressed via the mechanism of 
exit? In this Part, I explore the Net libertarian/consumer model and its underlying preference-
expressing mechanism of exit, which Lessig dismisses as incapable of bringing about a 
cyberspace reflective of our important collective values. In particular, I consider how well the 
Net libertarian/consumer model might reflect one important collective value: the First 
Amendment protection of unpopular or minority speech against majority tyranny. I focus on this 
value because it presents a potential difficulty for a model that responds (merely) to the 
aggregate of our individual preferences. I then consider whether a model premised upon voice 
instead of exit would better serve collective values. I conclude that the Net libertarian's claim that 
individuals' power of exit will necessarily serve as a sufficient check on the power of the market 
regardless of the characteristics of the market is unjustified, because the exit model is potentially 
inconsistent with (at least) our First Amendment commitment to protecting minority speech. I 
conclude further that Lessig's claim that a cyberspace governed by the exit model will fail to 
embody important collective values and will present circumstances justifying intervention to 
protect such values also stands in need of further support. 
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A. The Role of Exit in the (Net) Libertarian Model 
 
      To better understand the role of exit in the Net libertarian/consumer model, it will be helpful 
to consider the characteristics of the preference-expressing mechanisms of “exit” and “voice.” 
As outlined by Albert Hirschman in his influential work Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, [41] “exit” and 
“voice” are the two primary mechanisms by which individuals express their dissatisfaction with 
organizations, whether economic organizations like businesses, or political and communal 
organizations like school boards and political parties.  [42] The exit option, in which an 
individual simply stops buying a business's products or services or stops participating in an 
organization with which she is dissatisfied, is characteristic of and most typically employed in 
the economic realm. Exit is an indirect, impersonal, and non-participatory mechanism for 
expressing one's dissatisfaction. With exit, improvement of the exited organization comes about, 
if at all, courtesy of the invisible hand, and any such improvement does not redound to the 
benefit of the exiting consumer.  [43] For example, if a consumer does not like the new and 
improved Colgate, she can exercise her exit option, switch to Crest, and leave it to Colgate-
Palmolive to figure out why she left. In order for the preference-expressing mechanism of exit to 
be meaningfully exercised, the exiting individual must have an alternative institution to which to 
transfer her business or membership; exit can only be employed where there are at least two 
possible competing alternatives. 
 
      While the preference-expressing mechanism of exist is characteristic of the economic realm, 
the mechanism of voice is characteristic of the political and communal realm. [44] With the 
preference-expressing mechanism of voice, an individual expresses her dissatisfaction from 
within an organization. As between exit and voice, voice is the more direct, responsive, and 
participatory method of expressing one's dissatisfication with an organization, which one 
expresses while remaining within the organization. [45] Any resulting improvements in the 
organization benefits the dissatisfied member as well as her fellow members. If I am dissatisfied 
with the public schools in my area, for example, I can exercise my option of voice and become 
involved in and lobby the school board to bring about desired changes in the school (instead of 
exiting and transferring my children to a private school). Voice is most typically employed 
where exist is difficult or impossible to exercise, where alternative organizations are limited or 
non-existent, or where an individual has substantial investment in or commitment to a particular 
organization. Thus, in comparison to exit, voice is the more direct and participatory method of 
providing feedback, and expressing one's preferences and values, to an organization. Individuals 
make the decision whether to exercise exit or voice based on a number of factors, including the 
likelihood that the organization with which one is dissatisfied will respond to one's voice, how 
much one has invested in or is committed to the organization, and-importantly-whether viable 
alternative organizations exist. 
 
      Consider how exit is employed as a preference-expressing mechanism in the 
cybermarketplace. The Internet allows for the creation of a wide variety of value-sets or rule-
sets, which offer users the option of choosing among such sets according to their preferences. By 
exercising their option of entering one value-set and exiting another, users thereby express their 
preferences vis-à-vis such value-sets. As David Post and David Johnson describe the role of exit 
in the net libertarian model: 
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       The separation of subsidiary “territories” or spheres of activity within Cyberspace ... 
allow[s] for the development of distinct rule sets and for the divergence of those rule sets 
over time .... Content or conduct acceptable in one “area” of the Net may be banned in 
another ....       ....       ... [As compared to real space, in cyberspace] any given user has a 
more accessible exit option, in terms of moving from one virtual environment's rule set to 
another's .... [46]      For example, if AOL prohibits certain forms of speech, and if an 
individual is opposed to such prohibitions, she can vote with her mouse, leave AOL, and 
choose another ISP with a value-set better reflective of her own. 
 
      The competition among value-sets or rule-sets in the Net libertarian model is similar to that 
set forth in the libertarian utopian framework articulated by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia. Within the libertarian utopian framework, individuals have the freedom to join 
together to form communities of common value-sets and to exit from communities that no longer 
reflect their value-sets. Nozick articulates two components of the libertarian utopian framework: 
(1) a “wide and diverse range of communities,” with a corresponding wide range of value-sets 
adopted by such communities; [47] and (2) a great liberty to choose among this wide range of 
communities [48] (and, what follows, ease of exiting one community and entering (or if 
necessary creating) another that better accords with an individual's value choices). Within the 
libertarian utopian framework, government intervention into communities' value-sets is 
unjustified because individuals can be trusted to act in their best interest in exercising their 
freedom to choose which communities to join and, accordingly, which values to live by. [49] 
 
      Consistent with the libertarian utopian framework articulated by Nozick, the Net libertarian 
argues that in an unregulated cybermarketplace, different market actors will produce a wide and 
divergent range of code-sets, embodying different value choices (some consistent with the First 
Amendment, for example, others not), offering users the freedom to choose which value-set or 
code-set best accords with their preferences and values. If the speech-regarding values embodied 
in the First Amendment are truly important to an individual, then, according to the Net 
libertarian, she will not suffer any curtailment of such values-whether by private or public actors-
and will vote with her mouse to express her preferences regarding such values. In short, the Net 
libertarian claim is that a market on the Internet that aggregates our individual preferences in 
response to individual acts of exit will be sufficient to reflect our important values.  Although not 
always explicitly articulated, the premises of the Net libertarian claim are essentially those that 
undergird the libertarian utopian framework: (1) a wide and divergent range of value-sets will 
flourish on the Internet; and (2) exit from one value-set to another will be sufficiently easy to 
exercise. 
 
 
B. Exit, Individual Preferences, and Collective Values 
 
      If we accept that the Net libertarian premises obtain on the Internet- which Lessig apparently 
does not [50]-we may go on to consider whether there are certain collective values that will not 
be embodied in a cybermarket that merely reflects the aggregate of our individual preferences. 
For example, consider how well a market premised upon the mechanism of exit will respect the 
commitment embodied in the First Amendment to protect unpopular or minority speech from 
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majority tyranny. [51] Suppose that only a small portion, say five percent, of the relevant 
population favors the protection of a certain form of speech (be it “crude” sexual expression, 
speech advocating illegal drug use, graphic depictions of abortion procedures, etc.). Suppose 
further that the First Amendment embodies the collective value of protecting the expression of 
such minority speech, even against the majority's unwillingness to protect such speech. What can 
be said about how well a cybermarket that (merely) aggregates our individual preferences-in 
response to our individual acts of exit-would protect such countermajoritarian speech-regarding 
values? 
 
      Cass Sunstein, among others, has examined this issue in a related context, and contends that 
free speech values may be endangered by an unregulated market, a system of “laissez faire and 
the ‘invisible hand’ for free speech ....” [52] He argues that a well-functioning system of free 
expression “is not intended to aggregate existing [individual] private preferences,” but rather 
must incorporate certain collective values, such as exposure to diverse views and deep attention 
to public issues, that will not necessarily be realized in an unregulated market. [53] Sunstein 
observes that, 
 
       In principle, it does seem clear that [a free market in communications] could generate a 
range of serious problems .... [If] the allocation of speech rights was decided through an 
ordinary pricing system, like the allocation of soap, or cars, or candy, ... [s]uch a system 
would [fail to incorporate certain speechregarding values, and for example, would] ensure 
that dissident speech ... would be foreclosed. [54]      Sunstein suggests that such problems 
with an unregulated market in speech are problems “in principle” or potential problems, 
not problems that will inevitably flow from an unregulated speech market. Rather, 
Sunstein's analysis counsels in favor of a careful consideration of the actual features and 
characteristics of each particular marketplace for speech in evaluating whether potential 
problems are likely to materialize in any given unregulated speech market. Although it is 
possible that an unregulated speech market might be underprotective of minority speech, it 
is also possible that the characteristics of such a market would obviate such dangers. 
Careful attention to the features and characteristics of the marketplace for speech under 
consideration is therefore warranted. 
 
      In considering whether an unregulated cybermarketplace for speech is likely to suffer from 
the problems described above, it is important to consider whether a wide and divergent range of 
value-sets will actually be available for individuals to choose among. It is also helpful to 
compare the market for speech on the Net with other markets for speech, such as the broadcast 
television market or the metropolitan newspaper market. In the broadcast television market, 
before the creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the advent of cable television, 
the three major networks essentially controlled speech on the airwaves. If the networks declined 
access to the airwaves for a certain class of speech, it could plausibly be argued that this 
marketplace for speech was not well-functioning.  [55] Similarly, if a metropolitan area 
supported only one or two major newspapers, and those newspapers refused to allow for the 
expression of diverse viewpoints on issues of public import, it could plausibly be argued that 
such a marketplace for speech was not well-functioning. [56] The marketplace for speech on the 
Net, however, has a very different set of salient features and characteristics than these other 
speech markets. On the Internet, the number of market players, the diversity of market offerings, 
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and the ease of exiting one “organization” and entering another make exit a far more meaningful 
and trustworthy mechanism for expressing preferences and values in cyberspace. While the 
limited number of market players and the limited range of value-sets in the broadcast television 
and metropolitan newspaper markets support the argument that exit alone cannot be trusted to 
bring about a speech market that reflects our important collective values-and that government 
intervention into such markets to protect important collective values is warrented-this argument 
does not carry over well to the cyber-market, is given the different features and characteristics of 
this market. 
 
      To see this, consider, for example, the likelihood that unpopular or minority speech will find 
an avenue of expression in the cybermarket for speech as compared to the broadcast television 
market. Suppose an individual wishes to advocate the use of illegal drugs or criticize a particular 
abortion procedure using graphic terms or images, or to otherwise engage in unpopular/minority 
expression. While it is likely that such minority speech will not find an avenue for expression in 
an unregulated broadcast television market, can the same be said of an unregulated 
cybermarketplace for speech? This depends, in part, upon how many vehicles for expression can 
be supported in the cybermarketplace and whether the valuesets adopted by such market actors 
will converge on a set of majoritarian values-i.e., on whether the libertarian premises in fact 
obtain on the Net. [57] If the cybermarket were to only support five commerical ISPs with 
roughly equal shares of the market, [58] and if protection of the minority speech under 
consideration were supported by only five percent of the relevant market, it is likely that none of 
the ISPs would choose to protect such minority speech and that such a marketplace would not 
appropriately reflect the collective value of protecting minority speech. Of further concern is the 
possibility that an ISP would not only prohibit such speech within its own cyberplaces (e.g., 
AOL-sponsored chat rooms), but would also prohibit its members from using or accessing such 
speech in other cyberplaces. [59] If each of the commercial actors in the cybermarketplace were 
to embody such speech-regarding values in its code, the collective value of protecting minority 
speech would be endangered and some form of intervention would be warranted. But Lessig has 
not convincingly demonstrated that the features and characteristics of the cybermarket are or 
soon will be such that this important collective value, or other important collective values, will 
be endangered by a cybermarket that merely aggregates individual preferences. Rather, given the 
wide and divergent range of value-sets available in the cybermarketplace for speech, it appears 
that exit will remain a meaningful and viable option for individuals to exercise, that adequate 
avenues for minority speech will remain available, and that the collective value of protecting 
minority speech will not be endangered by an unregulated cybermarketplace. 
 
 
C. Voice and the Expression of Collective Values on the Net 
 
      I have argued above that a cybermarket premised upon exit as a preference-expressing 
mechanism is potentially inconsistent with the protection of important collective values, but that 
Lessig has not shown that such problems are likely to materialize given the features and 
characteristics of the cybermarketplace. In this section, I consider whether a model of cyberspace 
premised upon voice as a preference-expressing mechanism-a model in which “humans ... 
increase the contexts where they are members” [60] and “relate to cyberspace as members rather 
than as customers” [61]-would be better suited to bringing about a cyberspace more reflective of 
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our important collective values. As discussed above, using the mechanism of voice, individuals 
are able to contribute to the value-sets of the organizations of which they are members. Rather 
than simply exiting when they disagree with an organization's values, individuals employing the 
option of voice work from within to attempt to reshape those values. Consider, then, whether a 
model of cyberspace in which individuals exercised the preference-expressing mechanism of 
voice-and in which institutions responded to their members' exercise of voice-would incorporate 
important collective values better than a model premised solely upon exit. 
 
      Let us return to the example described above in which five ISPs enjoy roughly equal shares 
of the market, a five percent minority is in favor of a particular type of speech, but not users 
express their preferences through the mechanism of voice rather than exit. Depending upon the 
configuration of voting blocs, a market based on the preference-expressing mechanism of voice 
(in the form of a majority voting rule) would also likely result in each of the five ISPs adopting 
value-sets that are hostile to minority speech. That is, a model in which users “increase the 
contexts where they are members” [62] and enjoy the ability to vote for and exercise some 
control over the values embodied by commercial actors within their code would fare no better 
than the exit model on this score, in that both would merely reflect the aggregate of individual 
preferences. A model premised upon members' exercise of their “ordinary” voice (as we might, 
paraphrasing Lessig, [63] call such an exercise of voice) would not move us any further toward 
the goal of building a cyberspace that embodies our important collective values. While Lessig 
favors a model of cyberspace in which individuals are conceptualized as “members rather than as 
customers,” [64] he at the same time expresses skepticism about the desirability of a cyberspace 
reflective of our “ordinary” expressions of individual preferences. On this point, Lessig claims 
that “[i]t has never been our ideal ... that democracy be a perfect reflection of the present 
temperature of the people ... Democracy was [intended] to be more than a string of excited 
utterances of the people.” [65] And Lessig argues that, to make matters worse, technology tends 
to produce expressions of voice-the “flash pulse of the people” [66] or “a string of excited 
utterances of the people” [67]-that are particularly illsuited to eliciting important collective 
values, because such technology facilitated expressions of voice are likely to be hastily made and 
ill-informed: 
 
       As the cost of monitoring the current view of the population drops, ... we are producing 
a perpetual stream of data about what “the people” think about every issue .... We rarely 
ask, however, whether perfect monitoring is a good.       There is an important reason to be 
skeptical of the flash pulse of the people. The flash pulse is questionable not because the 
people are uneducated or incapable of good judgment, ... but because it is often the product 
of ignorance. People often have ill-informed or partially informed views that they simply 
repeat as judgments .... Technology encourages this sort of judgment.  [68]      According to 
Lessig, then, a cyberspace in which organizations respond to and reflect individuals' 
“ordinary” voice on the Net would be particularly unsupportive of our important collective 
values. Lessig contends, following Sunstein, [69] that we need somehow to move beyond 
this ordinary expression of voice, the flash pulse of the people, to a model that incorporates 
a more thoughtful, reflective, balanced, and deliberative voice of the people. In Sunstein's 
words, the creation of a 
 
       [well-functioning system of free expression] is closely connected to the central 
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constitutional goal of creating a deliberative democracy, .... [ [which] is not intended to 
aggregate existing private preferences .... Instead it is designed to have an important 
deliberative feature .... Through exposure to such information and perspectives, both 
collective and individual decisions can be shaped and improved. [70]      Similarly, Lessig 
proffers a model for embodying values on the Net in which individuals exercise their 
power of voice, but a voice formulated and expressed in a deliberative key. Lessig contends 
that, in expressing our voice on the Net, we need to move beyond the techniques of the 
“flash pulse of the people” [71] toward a method of eliciting important, collective, 
deliberative values: 
 
       There are techniques for polling that compensate for the errors of the flash poll and 
produce judgments that are both more considered and more stable.       An example is the 
“deliberative” poll devised by Professor James Fishkin. Rather than a pulse, Fishkin's polls 
seek an equilibrium. [The deliberative poll] bring[s] a cross-section of people .... [and gives 
them] information before the poll that helps ensure that they know something about the 
subject matter .... [Those being polled] argue about the topic at issue and exchange views 
about how best to resolve it. At the end, they are asked about their views, and their 
responses at this point form the “results” of the poll.       The great advantage of this system 
is not only that information is provided but that the process is deliberative. The results 
emerge out of the reasoning of citizens debating with other citizens. People are not 
encouraged to just cast a ballot. They give reasons for their ballot, and those reasons will or 
will not persuade.       ....       Cyberspace might make this process where reasons count 
more possible .... It is possible to imagine using the architecture of the space to design 
deliberative forums ....       ....       We could build some of this [deliberation] back into our 
democracy. The more we do, the less significant the flash pulses would be. And the less 
significant these flash pulses are, the more we might have faith again in that part of our 
tradition that made us revolutionaries in 1791-the commitment to a form of government 
that respects deliberation, and the people .... [72]      Lessig appears to content that voice is 
preferable to exit as a preference-expressing mechanism, but only if and to the extent that 
voice can be rendered more thoughtful, deliberative, balanced, and therefore better able to 
elicit important collective values. According to Lessig, even though we cannot trust a 
market based on exit, nor on ordinary voice, to reflect our important collective values, if 
the meta-value of deliberation were some-how built into voice, we would be more justified 
in trusting such a market. Because building the meta-value of deliberation into our 
articulation and expression of voice would be in society's long-term best interests, the 
government (or some other vehicle for collective action) would be justified, according to 
Lessig, in intervening in the market to impose the conditions for deliberation in cyberspace. 
 
      In sum, Lessig argues that exit is an inappropriate method for individuals to express their 
preferences on the Net. But he also suggests that voice, if exercised in an ordinary and non-
deliberative manner on the Net, is also insufficient to bring about the embodiment of our 
important collective values. He appears to contend that the only way for individuals to express 
preferences in a manner supportive of our important collective values is by building the meta-
value of deliberation into our exercise of voice on the Net. Doing so, however, would require 
intervention in the market by the government or some other vehicle for collective action, which 
would be necessary to bring about the conditions under which true freedom will flourish. I have 
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contended, however, that Lessig too hastily concludes that exit is an inappropriate mechanism 
for expressing preferences and reflecting our important values on the Net. Exit should not be 
dismissed out of hand as being insufficiently supportive of important collective values; rather, 
we must consider the features and characteristics of the particular market in which exit serves as 
a preference-expressing mechanism and the particular collective values to be served in order to 
determine whether such values are actually likely to be embodied in an unregulated market. 
Lessig has not convincingly demonstrated that the features and characteristics of the cybermarket 
are (or soon will be) such that our important collective values will be endangered by a 
cybermarket that merely aggregates individual preferences. Nor has he shown that governmental 
(or other types of) intervention in the cybermarket is warranted for the purpose of securing 
collective values. While government intervention might eventually be necessary if the potential 
of the market model to dis-regard certain collective values were to materialize, we are not there 
yet. 
 
 
V. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE REGULATIONS ON THE NET 
 
      I have argued that, given the characteristics of the cybermarketplace- including the number of 
market players, the diversity of market offerings, and the case of exit-intervention to enforce the 
recognition of certain collective values within commercial actors' code or to instill deliberation 
into individuals' formation and expression of preferences is unwarranted. Yet I have also argued 
that an unregulated marketplace could potentially lead to a state of affairs in which certain 
important collective values-such as the protection of minority speech from majority tyranny-are 
not respected. When and if such a state of affairs were to obtain-as it arguably did in the 
broadcast television market-would the government be able to intervene to remedy such 
problems? Lessig's answer is no-primarily because he believes that the state action doctrine as 
presently interpreted will prohibit courts from holding private actors in check by constitutional 
values (and because we do not trust the legislature to act on our behalf in this regard). [73] 
Lessig is ultimately quite pessimistic (if not despondent) about both the likelihood that a 
cyberspace premised upon the model of the market will embody our important collective values 
and the willingness of government to intervene to remedy such defects in the market if and when 
they arise. I have argued in Part III that Lessig has not made out the case that a cyberspace 
premised upon the model of the market will fail to embody our important collective values. In 
this Part, I argue that neither has he made the case that courts will refuse to intervene to check 
the power of private actors when and if necessary to protect our important collective values. On 
the contrary, doctrinal support exists for courts to impose checks on the power of private 
regulators where such regulation threatens important collective values. 
 
      The history of government regulation of private actors in emerging media and within new 
forums suggests that when there is justifiable reason for the government to distrust and insert 
itself into the market, action by various branches of the government will be forthcoming. 
Consider, for example, the government's involvement in regulating private actor's ownership and 
control of broadcast media. Throughout the past century, the government struggled to determine 
how best to structure ownership of the airwaves and how much autonomy to grant to private 
broadcasters in order to protect free expression in and access to this medium. In CBS, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, [74] for example, the Supreme Court considered a challenge 
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brought by the Democratic National Committee and an anti-war group to private broadcasters' 
denial of their request to purchase air time to express their anti-war views. The Court's 
determination of the contours of the public/private dichotomy and application of the state action 
doctrine in this context involved an inquiry into the characteristics of the market for speech 
under consideration, as well as an intricate and complex balancing of the competing First 
Amendment interests of private broadcasters and members of the public seeking access to the 
airwaves.  [75] Instead of simply abdicating its responsibility to protect individuals' free speech 
rights against regulation by private entities-as Lessig predicts of the cyberspace context [76]-the 
Court in CBS v. Democratic National Committee carefully considered arguments in favor of and 
against allowing individuals to assert a First Amendment right of access and free speech against 
private regulators. (Furthermore, when other branches of the government found the Court's 
evaluation of these competing interests in CBS v. Democratic National Committee wanting, the 
legislature acted to secure important free speech rights against private regulators through the 
passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. [77]) 
 
      Consider also the Court's interpretation of the state action doctrine in the context of the denial 
by private “company towns” [78] and shopping malls [79] of access for purposes of expressive 
activities. There again, the Court balanced the free speech rights of members of the public 
against the property and free speech rights of private regulators. In both the company town and 
private shopping mall cases, the Court's decisions were premised in part on the consideration of 
whether those wishing to engage in expressive activity on private property had alternative 
avenues of communication open to them.  [80] Although the Court (for the time being) has 
determined that the property rights of private shopping mall owners outweigh members of the 
public's interest in exercising their right to free expression within those malls, the balancing of 
interests undertaken by the Court and the importance the Court places on alternative avenues of 
communication suggest that courts will be sensitive to similar constitutional claims against 
private regulators in cyberspace. This is especially true if private regulators in cyberspace settle 
upon a uniform set [81] of restrictive values in their code that leave no alternative avenues of 
communication open for certain types of expression. 
 
      In addition to the state action doctrine as a vehicle for balancing the First Amendment rights 
of market actors against the First Amendment rights of the public, the government has used other 
mechanisms to remedy defects in markets for speech. For example, in attempting to remedy the 
problems arising from a market in speech driven solely by the profit motive, the government 
used its allocative power in the 1960s to establish the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. [82] 
In so doing, Congress attempted to introduce a voice into the broadcast market that would be 
more supportive of and more conductive to meaningful, deliberative, and collective self-
governance. [83] It is quite plausible that, when and if necessary to secure adequate avenues of 
communication for unpopular speech on the Net, or to secure other collective values, the 
government would act to establish a public ISP or other public channels for expression. 
 
      In short, the government has various means available to it to ensure that the market for 
speech on the Net will operate in a manner that is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” [84] In 
applying the state action doctrine to private regulation in various mediums and forums, the Court 
has essentially balanced the rights of private regulators against the competing rights of 
individuals subject to such regulation. In undertaking this analysis, the Court has also considered 
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whether the private regulation at issue leaves open alternative avenues of communication. The 
inquiry into whether alternative avenues of communication are available is substantially the same 
inquiry required of us in evaluating whether the exit model will suffice to reflect the important 
collective value of protecting minority speech on the Net. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
      Lessig's overarching concern is that behavior in cyberspace will be regulated by Commerce 
and that such regulation will be driven by Commerce's interests, not ours. He is deeply skeptical 
about a cyberspace constructed on the model of the market and about the market's underlying 
preference-expressing mechanism of exit, because he believes that a cyberspace governed by exit 
will reflect, at best, the aggregate of our individual values and not our important collective 
values. I have argued that Lessig has not made the case that a cyberspace governed by the market 
mechanism of exit will fail to incorporate important collective values. The possibility certainly 
exists that markets governed by exit alone will fail to incorporate important collective values, 
such as the First Amendment value of protecting unpopular speech against majority tyranny. But 
whether such a possibility will materialize is a function of the features and characteristics of the 
particular market under consideration as well as the nature of the collective value at risk. Lessig 
has not shown that such a possibility is likely to materialize in the cyberspace of the near future. 
Lessig also claims that the government will fail to take any measures to remedy the 
cybermarket's (potential) failure to embody our important collective values and that the state 
action doctrine will render courts powerless to remedy such problems. I have argued that 
doctrinal support exists for courts to hold in check the power of private regulators where such 
regulation threatens the important collective value of protecting unpopular speech. In short, 
Lessig has not shown that a cyberspace governed by the market mechanism of exit will fail to 
incorporate important collective values, nor has he shown that if and when cyberspace does fail 
to incorporate such values, courts will be powerless to act to protect such values. 
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